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A SEARCH-COSTS THEORY OF LIMITING 
DOCTRINES IN TRADEMARK LAW∗ 
By Stacey L. Dogan∗∗ and Mark A. Lemley∗∗∗  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Twenty years have passed since William Landes and Richard 
Posner wrote their classic economic defense of trademark laws.1 
Under Landes and Posner’s “search costs” theory, trademarks have 
value because they reduce consumer search costs and thus 
promote overall efficiency in the economy. Over the past two 
decades, the search costs theory of trademark law has attracted a 
substantial following among both commentators and courts.2 
While the search costs theory provides a compelling argument 
for trademark rights, it also compels an equally important—but 
often overlooked—set of principles for defining and limiting those 
rights. Certainly, trademark laws can make it easier and cheaper 
for consumers to locate products with desired qualities, thus 
                                                                                                               
 
 ∗ © 2007 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley. This paper is a continuation of a larger 
project on trademarks, and portions of the text are adapted from our article Trademarks 
and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 Hous. L. Rev. 777 (2004) [hereinafter Dogan 
& Lemley, Search Costs]. This article originally appeared in Trademark Law and Theory: A 
Handbook of Contemporary Research (Dinwoodie & Janis eds. 2007). Thanks to Graeme 
Dinwoodie, Eric Goldman, Rose Hagan, Laura Heymann, Justin Hughes, Mark Janis, Ariel 
Katz, Doug Lichtman, Peter Menell, Michael Meurer, Sandra Rierson, Peter Swire, Rita 
Weeks and participants in workshops at the 2004 IPIL/Houston Santa Fe Conference: 
Trademark in Transition, Boston University Law School, the Intellectual Property Scholars’ 
Conference at DePaul College of Law, George Washington University National Law Center, 
Stanford Law School, Thomas Jefferson School of Law, and the University of San Diego Law 
School for discussions and comments on this or that earlier project. 
 ∗∗ Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law. 
 ∗∗∗ William H. Neukom Professor of Law, Stanford Law School; of counsel, Keker & 
Van Nest LLP. 
 1. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic 
Perspective, 30 J. L. & Econ. 265 (1987). 
 2. E.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995); Brennan’s, 
Inc. v. Brennan’s Restaurant, L.L.C., 360 F.3d 125, 132 (2d Cir. 2004); Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 
306 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2002); New Kids on the Block v. News Amer. Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 
305 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1992); Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1029, 1056-59 (2006); 
Maureen A. O’Rourke, Defining the Limits of Free-Riding in Cyberspace: Trademark 
Liability for Metatagging, 33 Gonz. L. Rev. 277, 306-07 & n 114 (1997); Margreth Barrett, 
Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of “Trademark Use,” 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 371, 
376-78 (2006). But see Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 
82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1839 (2007) (challenging search costs rationale and pointing to an 
amorphous concept of unfair competition as the predominant driving force behind 
trademark law). 
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making markets more competitive. Yet if carried too far, 
trademark law can do the opposite: it can entrench market 
dominance by leading firms and make it harder for competitors to 
crack new markets. The evolution of trademark law reflects a 
continual balancing act that seeks to maximize the informational 
value of marks while avoiding their use to suppress competitive 
information. 
Most of the literature on the search costs theory of trademark 
law has focused on the theory as a rationale for trademark 
protection. In this article, we examine its role in supporting 
limiting doctrines in trademark law.3 Some limiting doctrines 
unambiguously lower consumer search costs and thus promote the 
goals of trademark law. Another group of doctrines, however, 
involves behavior that increases consumer search costs for some 
individuals even as it improves economic conditions for others. 
These latter doctrines—genericness, functionality, and 
abandonment—may sometimes go too far in accepting increased 
consumer search costs as the cost of achieving competition. Rather 
than the all-or-nothing approach suggested by these doctrines, the 
authors suggest that consumers would benefit from a more 
nuanced approach in their application. 
II. TRADEMARKS AND INFORMATION 
A. Economic Theory—Trademarks and Search Costs 
Most people think of trademark law in terms of what it 
forbids: the use of another party’s trademark, or something 
resembling it, in a way that will cause confusion among consumers 
in the marketplace. Courts commonly describe the goal of 
trademark law as avoiding consumer confusion, which has the 
corollary effect of preventing the appropriation of a producer’s 
goodwill.4 Both consumers and producers, these courts point out, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 3. By and large, these limiting doctrines are defenses. However, some of the doctrines 
we discuss here have a more complex relationship to the prima facie case of trademark 
infringement. There is controversy over whether the trademark use requirement is a 
defense or a part of the trademark owner’s affirmative case, for example, and the doctrine of 
functionality is sometimes a defense and sometimes a part of the prima facie case, 
depending on which section of the Lanham Act is invoked. We have chosen the term 
“limiting doctrines” to avoid any confusion on this point. We also wish to make it clear that 
we have chosen only a subset of those doctrines for discussion in this paper. 
 4. See, e.g., Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 197-98 (1985) 
(noting that the goal of trademark protection is to protect the consumer’s ability “to 
distinguish among competing producers”); Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 
2002) (noting that the central concern of trademark law is to provide consumers with “a 
concise and unequivocal identifier of the particular source of particular goods”). 
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benefit when the public has access to truthful information about 
the source of products and services.5 
In economic terms, trademarks contribute to economic 
efficiency by reducing consumer search costs.6 Rather than having 
to inquire into the provenance and qualities of every potential 
purchase, consumers can look to trademarks as shorthand 
indicators. Because this short-hand information is less expensive 
than detailed inquiries, consumers can more easily obtain and 
process it and will arguably become better informed, resulting in a 
more competitive market.7 This system works, of course, only if 
                                                                                                                 
 
 5. See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163-64; Park ’N Fly, 469 U.S. at 197-98 (considering the 
benefits to consumers and producers that motivated Congress to pass the Lanham Act); 
Perryman, 306 F.3d at 510. 
 6. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual 
Property Law 167-68 (2003); Nicholas S. Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 
TMR 523, 525-27 (1988) (discussing the economic benefits of marks that apprise consumers 
of products’ unobservable features); Nicholas S. Economides, Trademarks, in 3 The New 
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 602 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) [hereinafter 
Economides, Trademarks] (describing the savings for consumers in product searches as one 
of “[t]he primary reasons for the existence and protection of trademarks”); Brian A. Jacobs, 
Trademark Dilution on the Constitutional Edge, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 161, 164 (2004) (noting 
search costs rationale); Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 268-70 (identifying the lowering 
of brand recognition costs to consumers as the justification for trademark law); Mark A. 
Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 Yale L.J. 1687, 
1690-94 (1999) [hereinafter Lemley, Modern Lanham Act] (describing economic 
justifications for trademarks and advertising); I.P.L. Png & David Reitman, Why Are Some 
Products Branded and Others Not? 38 J.L. & Econ. 207, 208-11, 218 (1995) (analyzing 
empirical search cost data and suggesting that “consumers of products subject to 
performance uncertainty will pay for brand-name assurance”); John F. Coverdale, 
Comment, Trademarks and Generic Words: An Effect-on-Competition Test, 51 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 867, 869-70 (1984) (noting that trademark law encourages competition, which 
potentially decreases the cost to consumers); see also Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163-64 
(explaining that trademark law “reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making 
purchasing decisions,” and “helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating 
competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable 
product” (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original)); Union Nat’l Bank of 
Tex., Laredo v. Union Nat’l Bank of Tex., Austin, 909 F.2d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 1990) (“The 
idea is that trademarks are ‘distinguishing’ features which lower consumer search costs and 
encourage higher quality production by discouraging free-riders.”). Cf. Mishawaka Rubber 
& Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942) (“A trade-mark is a 
merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has 
been led to believe he wants.”). 
For other applications of the search costs theory of trademarks, see, e.g., Michael 
Grynberg, The Road Not Taken: Initial Interest Confusion, Consumer Search Costs, and the 
Challenge of the Internet, 28 Seattle U. L. Rev. 97 (2004). To be sure, there have been other 
explanations offered for trademark law. We analyze and critique several of them in Dogan 
& Lemley, Search Costs, supra note *. 
 7. See Hal R. Varian, Microeconomic Analysis 82 (2d ed. 1984) (describing “perfect 
information” as one of the characteristics of a competitive market). To some extent, the 
brand-based product differentiation encouraged by trademark law arguably runs in tension 
with the law’s information-facilitating goals. Ralph Brown famously argued that strong 
trademark protection has the effect of misallocating resources toward advertising, “[m]ost 
[of which], however, is designed not to inform, but to persuade and influence.” Ralph S. 
Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 Yale 
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consumers can trust the accuracy of trademarks, and this is where 
the law comes in.8 By protecting established trademarks against 
confusing imitation, the law ensures a reliable vocabulary for 
communications between producers and consumers. Both sellers 
and buyers benefit from the ability to trust this vocabulary to 
mean what it says. Sellers benefit because they can invest in 
goodwill with the knowledge that others will not appropriate it.9 
Consumers benefit because they do not have to do exhaustive 
research or even spend extra time looking at labels before making 
a purchase; they can know, based on a brand name, that a product 
has the features they are seeking.10 Trademark law, in other 
words, aims to promote rigorous, truthful competition in the 
marketplace by preserving the clarity of the language of trade.11 
                                                                                                                                         
 
L.J. 1165, 1169 (1948) (footnote omitted). Furthermore, “[c]onsidering the economic welfare 
of the community as a whole, to use up part of the national product persuading people to 
buy product A rather than product B appears to be a waste of resources.” Id. Yet 
trademarks undeniably provide value in conveying information about products and sources. 
Thus, “the only sensible conclusion, and the one eventually reached, was that trademark 
protection can both advance and disserve the development of an efficient and desirably 
competitive market.” Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 Emory L.J. 367, 370 
(1999). The key was to craft rules that minimized trademarks’ anticompetitive effects. Id. at 
371. 
The separate question of when and how consumers seek and process information is a 
complex one, drawing from neuroscience as well as marketing theory. For glimpses, see, e.g., 
Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 Emory L.J. 507 
(2005); Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in 60 Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Neuroscience 
(working paper 2007); Thomas Lee, Trademarks, Consumer Psychology, and the 
Sophisticated Consumer, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
967742 (working paper 2007).  
 8. See Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 270 (“If the law does not prevent it, free 
riding will eventually destroy the information capital embodied in a trademark, and the 
prospect of free riding may therefore eliminate the incentive to develop a valuable 
trademark in the first place.”). 
 9. By preserving the integrity of brands and advertising, trademark protection has a 
corollary effect of creating incentives to maintain high quality products. See Robert G. Bone, 
Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 Va. L. Rev. 2099, 2108 (2004) (“[I]f 
consumers lacked the ability to distinguish one brand from another, firms would have no 
reason to create brands with more costly but higher quality characteristics.”). 
 10. See Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1968) (“Preservation of the 
trademark as a means of identifying the trademark owner’s products . . . makes effective 
competition possible in a complex, impersonal marketplace by providing a means through 
which the consumer can identify products which please him and reward the producer with 
continued patronage. Without some such method of product identification, informed 
consumer choice, and hence meaningful competition in quality, could not exist.”). 
 11. See Economides, Trademarks, supra note 6, at 602 (stating that trademarks 
“facilitate and enhance consumer decisions”); William P. Kratzke, Normative Economic 
Analysis of Trademark Law, 21 Memphis St. U. L. Rev. 199, 214-17 (1991) (arguing that 
trademarks are highly efficient means of conveying product information); Phillip Nelson, 
Advertising as Information, 82 J. Pol. Econ. 729, 729-31, 743-52 (1974) (arguing that the 
simple fact that a product is advertised conveys information about the “experience qualities” 
of that product); Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. Pol. Econ. 311, 
323-25 (1970) (comparing the advantages of national-brand versus retail advertising); 
Vol. 97 TMR 1227 
 
While the reduction of consumer search costs and the 
encouragement of goodwill investment represent critical 
intermediate objectives of the trademark system, neither of these 
goals is an end in itself. The law reduces consumer search costs in 
order to facilitate the functioning of a competitive marketplace. 
Informed consumers will make better-informed purchases, which 
will increase their overall utility and push producers to develop 
better quality products.12 Trademark law, then, aims to promote 
more competitive markets by improving the quality of information 
in those markets.13 
Trademark law therefore represents an affirmation of, rather 
than a departure from, the competitive model that drives the 
United States economy. It is in this respect distinct from the rest 
of intellectual property (IP) law, which departs from the 
competitive norm in order to encourage investment in invention 
and creation.14 Like antitrust laws, false advertising laws, and 
other consumer protection statutes, trademark law both draws 
from and reinforces the notion that competitive markets, under 
ordinary circumstances, will ensure efficient resource allocation 
and bring consumers the highest quality products at the lowest 
prices.15 
B. Some Limiting Rules of Trademark Law and 
Their Search Costs Rationale 
The pro-information, pro-competition goal of trademark law 
has several important implications for the scope of trademark 
protection, particularly in comparison to other areas of IP law. 
Overly restrictive trademark law has the potential to stifle 
competition rather than to facilitate it. Particularly when 
trademark holders have economic power, giving them absolute 
control over uses of their marks could erect significant barriers to 
                                                                                                                                         
 
George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. Pol. Econ. 213, 220-24 (1961) 
(arguing that, although imperfect, advertising is a valuable means to reduce consumer 
ignorance). 
 12. Indeed, classical economics requires fully informed buyers and sellers as a 
condition for a perfectly competitive economy. See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Shaping 
Competition on the Internet: Who Owns Product and Pricing Information? 53 Vand. L. Rev. 
1965, 1968 (2000) (describing conditions for perfectly competitive market). 
 13. Cf. Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 379 (2d Cir. 
1997) (“[T]he Lanham Act must be construed in light of a strong federal policy in favor of 
vigorously competitive markets, which is exemplified by the Sherman Act and other anti-
trust laws.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property 
Law, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 989 (1997). 
 15. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 
Tex. L. Rev. 1031 (2005).  
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entry for competitors seeking to describe their own products.16 
Even in less differentiated markets, strong trademark rights come 
at a cost because they have the potential to remove words from our 
language and product features from competition.17 One task of 
trademark law, then, is to preserve the informative role of 
trademarks while minimizing these downside risks. One way 
trademark law does this is by granting trademark owners rights 
that are less than absolute. 
First and most generally, trademarks are not property rights 
in gross, but limited entitlements to protect against uses that 
diminish the informative value of marks.18 Trademark law 
historically limited itself to preventing uses of marks that 
“defraud[ed] the public”19 by confusing people into believing that 
an infringer’s goods were produced or sponsored by the trademark 
holder.20 Likelihood of confusion does not necessarily follow every 
                                                                                                                 
 
 16. See Lunney, supra note 7, at 421 (noting that trademark protection may encourage 
monopolistic behavior). 
 17. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in 
the Pepsi Generation, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 397, 398-99 (1990) (noting that current 
jurisprudence deals poorly with the evolving significance of trademarks as a part of 
language). 
 18. See Beanstalk Group, Inc. v. AM Gen. Corp., 283 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(stating that “a trademark is an identifier, not a freestanding piece of intellectual property; 
hence the rule that a trademark cannot be sold in gross, that is, without the assets that 
create the product that it identifies”); Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(invoking the rule against assignments of trademarks in gross, which states that “[a] trade 
name or mark is merely a symbol of goodwill; it has no independent significance apart from 
the goodwill it symbolizes”). See generally ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 922 
(6th Cir. 2003) (differentiating between trademarks and patents because the latter confer a 
property right in gross rather than a limited interest). Professor Landes and Judge Posner 
explain that the rule against the transfer of trademarks in gross is important to prevent 
consumer deception during a “last-period” game, in which the company is going out of 
business and wishes to spend its goodwill; the long-term effect of permitting confusion of 
consumers in this way would be to increase aggregate search costs. See Landes & Posner, 
supra note 6, at 185-86; see also Kratzke, supra note 11, at 247-49 (offering an economic 
rationale for the rule “that a trademark user cannot assign the trademark in gross”); 
Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble With Trademark, 99 Yale L.J. 759, 786 (1990) (arguing that 
the prohibition on assignments in gross is consistent with trademark theory properly 
understood) [hereinafter Carter, Trouble With Trademark]. Cf. Lemley, Modern Lanham 
Act, supra note 6, at 1709-10 (criticizing trends in trademark law that permit transfers in 
gross). But see Allison Sell McDade, Note, Trading in Trademarks—Why the Anti-
Assignment in Gross Doctrine Should Be Abolished When Trademarks Are Used as 
Collateral, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 465 (1998) (proposing that in gross assignment rights be 
permitted when the assignment is offered as collateral for a loan). 
 19. Taylor v. Carpenter, 23 F. Cas. 742, 744 (C.C.D. Mass. 1844) (No. 13,784). 
 20. The most significant exception to this rule may be the merchandising cases, in 
which some courts have allowed trademark holders to prevent use of their marks as 
products, rather than as indicators of the brand or source of products. See, e.g., Boston 
Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 35 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding infringement in 
unauthorized sale of “Boston Marathon” T-shirts, reasoning that “when a manufacturer 
intentionally uses another’s mark as a means of establishing a link in consumers’ minds 
with the other’s enterprise, and directly profits from that link, there is an unmistakable 
Vol. 97 TMR 1229 
 
time a party adopts another’s trademark; it turns on a complex 
analysis that considers competitive proximity, consumer 
sophistication, and other factors that explore whether a use will 
truly create a false association in the minds of consumers, and 
thus taint the information marketplace.21 Although Congress 
recently added a federal cause of action based on the “dilution” of 
famous trademarks,22 the statute focuses on uses that increase 
consumer search costs, either by “blurring” the significance of a 
unique mark23 or by giving such a mark a negative association,24 
and to permit uses such as commentary and comparative 
advertising that actually facilitate consumer search.25 Like the 
                                                                                                                                         
 
aura of deception”). The Fifth Circuit ushered in this trend in the Boston Hockey opinion, 
which found infringement in the absence of any confusion as to source or sponsorship: 
The confusion or deceit requirement [of the Lanham Act] is met by the fact that the 
defendant duplicated the protected trademarks and sold them to the public knowing 
that the public would identify them as being the teams’ trademarks. The certain 
knowledge of the buyer that the source and origin of the trademark symbols were in 
plaintiffs satisfies the requirement of the act. 
Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th 
Cir. 1975) (emphasis added). But at least as many courts have rejected the merchandising 
theory, and it is likely the U.S. Supreme Court would do so as well. See Stacey L. Dogan & 
Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli? 54 Emory L.J. 
461, 496-505 (2005) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, Merchandising]; see also Lemley, Modern 
Lanham Act, supra note 6, at 1706-09 (criticizing the merchandising right cases). 
 21. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) 
(establishing factors of likelihood of confusion between different products in the Second 
Circuit); see also AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 & n.11, 349 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(identifying likelihood of confusion factors in the Ninth Circuit). 
 22. See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000) (providing 
federal cause of action for trademark dilution). Congress revised the statute in 2006 to 
modify the standard for establishing dilution and to clarify the scope of dilution defenses. 
See Federal Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, P.L. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730.  
 23. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (defining “dilution by blurring” as “association arising 
from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the 
distinctiveness of the famous mark”). At least in the case of truly singular marks, such 
dilution by blurring can increase consumer search costs by making consumers look further 
for context, rather than immediately associating the trademark with its sole owner. See 
O’Rourke, Defining the Limits, supra note 2 at 291-95 & n.65 (1997) (noting the harms of 
dilution). If consumers hear the term “Exxon,” they think immediately of the oil company. If 
they hear “National” or “United,” by contrast, they need context to understand what is being 
referred to. The risk of blurring is precisely that unique terms will over time be relegated to 
context-specific terms. Id.; Dogan & Lemley, Merchandising, supra note 20, at 493-95 
(explaining how dilution is consistent with the search costs rationale). One might 
reasonably question how much of an increase in search costs this represents, however. See 
Tushnet, supra note 7 (doing so). 
 24. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (defining dilution by tarnishment as “association arising from 
the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation 
of the famous mark”). 
 25. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (exempting parody, comparative commercial advertising, 
noncommercial use, and news reporting from a claim of trademark dilution). The Supreme 
Court further limited the original dilution law by interpreting it to require actual injury to the 
source-identifying function of a famous trademark. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 
1230 Vol. 97 TMR 
 
more traditional likelihood of confusion analysis, therefore, 
dilution—at least as properly understood26—turns on injury to the 
informative value of a mark.27 
Second, trademark law rewards—and provides incentives 
for—investment in goodwill, but does not provide rights to all of 
the economic value that derives from that goodwill. Our 
competitive economy is based on the premise that competitors can 
generally appropriate ideas for products and services, as long as 
they are doing so in a non-deceptive way and are not infringing 
some other exclusive right, such as copyright or patent.28 The 
                                                                                                                                         
 
537 U.S. 418, 432-34 (2003) (holding that 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) “requires a showing of 
actual dilution, rather than a likelihood of dilution”). Whether requiring actual harm was in 
fact in the public interest is open to question, because the federal dilution statute generally 
limits remedies to prospective injunctive relief. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2). And indeed 
Congress changed the standard to likelihood of confusion in its 2006 revisions. But the 
Court’s instinct that the law must limit the scope of dilution is in some ways undoubtedly 
correct, and the 2006 revisions also made it more difficult to qualify for dilution protection 
and expanded the defenses for those whose use of a mark was actually reducing, rather 
than increasing, search costs. 
 26. Although courts seem to understand the concept of blurring the distinctiveness of a 
formerly unique mark, they occasionally have more difficulty with dilution by tarnishment. 
In theory, tarnishment applies only where the defendant brands its own goods with the 
plaintiff’s mark, and where those goods are inferior in quality to or less reputable than the 
plaintiff’s unrelated goods. See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 31 (1st 
Cir. 1987) (noting that “[a] trademark is tarnished when consumer capacity to associate it 
with the appropriate products or services has been diminished [by being] linked to products 
which are of shoddy quality”). For example, if a defendant sells Toyota-brand pornography, 
those who encounter the use may think less highly of the Toyota brand name because they 
subconsciously associate it with pornography, even if they understand that the car company 
did not itself sponsor the materials. 
Courts applying the tarnishment doctrine have sometimes used it to target criticism 
or derogatory speech about the trademark owner, a result that finds little justification in 
the search costs rationale. See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 44-46 (2d 
Cir. 1994). Most courts, however, properly distinguish the two. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. 
Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 812 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that noncommercial 
parody is protected by the First Amendment and not subject to trademark dilution claims); 
MasterCard Int’l, Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1046, 1053-55 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (determining that Nader’s political advertisements in the 2000 presidential 
campaign were not commercial in nature and thus not actionable dilution). 
 27. See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433-34 (stating that under the FTDA, mental association 
with another product does “not necessarily reduce the capacity of the famous mark to 
identify the goods of its owner”); see also Stacey L. Dogan, An Exclusive Right to Evoke, 44 
B.C. L. Rev. 291, 315-16 (2003) (interpreting Moseley to limit the federal antidilution statute 
to uses that reduce the “singularity” of famous marks).  
 28. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001) (“[C]opying 
is not always discouraged or disfavored by the laws which preserve our competitive 
economy.”); Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85, 98 (S.D. Iowa 1982) (“It is not 
only fair to imitate non-patented functional products, it is necessary to our form of 
economy.”). When copying unprotected product features, competitors must sometimes take 
extra steps to protect against consumer confusion—for example, prominently using their 
own trademarks in marketing the copied product. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 
305 U.S. 111, 120 (1938) (“Kellogg Company was free to use the pillow-shaped form, subject 
only to the obligation to identify its product lest it be mistaken for that of the plaintiff.”); 
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patent and copyright systems represent a response to the potential 
market failure that can result from the copying of public goods.29 
By contrast, trademark law is avowedly not designed to resolve 
any perceived failure in the market for quality products and 
services, but instead failure in the market for information about 
those goods and services.30 Thus, trademark law is reluctant to 
provide protection for product configurations (where the shape is 
both the product and “information”) because doing so may give the 
trademark owner control not just over search characteristics, but 
also over the intrinsic value of the product itself.31 Only where the 
product configuration has an established meaning as a brand in 
the minds of consumers is it entitled to protection.32 Even then, 
protection does not extend to “functional” features that would limit 
competition on the merits in a particular product market.33  
The limitations considered in this section stem from the 
search-cost reducing goal of trademark law. When a word or 
product feature does not inform consumers about the product’s 
source or sponsorship, legal protection for that word or feature 
would not reduce consumer search costs and is therefore denied.34 
                                                                                                                                         
 
Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193, 195 (1st Cir. 1980) 
(determining that the defendant took the necessary precautions to avoid consumer 
confusion by clearly displaying its name and logo on the product). In this way, the courts 
protect the competitive marketplace while at the same time keeping search costs to a 
minimum. Cf. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964). Although states 
“may, in appropriate circumstances, require that goods . . . be labeled or that other 
precautionary steps be taken to prevent customers from being misled as to the source,” they 
“may not, when the article is unpatented and uncopyrighted, prohibit the copying of the 
article itself.” Id. at 232-33. 
 29. In economic terms, a public good is both nonrivalrous and nonexcludable, meaning 
that after it has been created and released, many parties can possess it simultaneously and 
the original creator cannot physically exclude others from doing so. See Bruce Abramson, 
Promoting Innovation in the Software Industry: A First Principles Approach to Intellectual 
Property Reform, 8 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 75, 92 (2002). U.S. copyright and patent law rest 
on the notion that, absent some form of legal protection, creators will under-invest in public 
goods such as useful inventions, art, and music. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric 
Market Failure and Prisoner’s Dilemma in Intellectual Property, 17 U. Dayton L. Rev. 853, 
854-55 (1992); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1610-11 (1982). 
 30. See TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 29 (noting that certain types of copying, such as 
reverse engineering, are fundamental to the workings of our competitive economy). 
 31. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 212-14 (2000) (pointing 
out that most design configurations reflect functional purposes rather than a means of 
identification for consumers). 
 32. Id. at 212.  
 33. See, e.g., Traffix Devices, 532 U.S. at 29. But cf. Bone, supra note 9, at 2175-81 
(noting that inquiry in functionality cases does not focus on the effect on competition in 
particular product markets, largely because of the difficulty of defining relevant markets). 
 34. For this reason, descriptive terms, like product configurations, merit protection 
only after they have acquired secondary meaning. See, e.g., Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove 
Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 790 (5th Cir. 1983). 
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Even when a mark is protected, the law quite reasonably permits 
uses of the mark that do not make a consumer’s search more 
difficult, either by confusing the consumer or reducing the capacity 
of the mark to identify goods. Absent some legitimate reason to 
prevent such use, trademark law accepts the core premise that 
unfettered competition will generate the best results for 
consumers.  
III. SEARCH COSTS AND TRADEMARK LIMITING 
DOCTRINES 
The rule that trademark law is designed to reduce search costs 
justifies not just boundaries on the affirmative scope of trademark 
rights but doctrines that carve out limits from the ordinary scope 
of those rights. In the most straightforward of the trademark 
limiting doctrines, a party’s truthful use of a mark unambiguously 
lowers search costs and thus deserves protection. Other doctrines, 
however, involve more uncertain informational effects. We 
consider both types of doctrines in this section. 
A. Limiting Doctrines That Unambiguously 
Lower Search Costs  
The first group of trademark doctrines is fairly 
straightforward. In these cases, the use the defendant makes of a 
mark is a truthful one that gives consumers valuable information, 
and so permitting the use is consistent with the goal of lowering 
consumer search costs. 
1. Comparative and Other Truthful Advertising 
One example is truthful advertising about the nature and 
source of the product. Resellers of new, used, and refurbished 
products have a right to use trademarks to accurately identify the 
original source of the goods.35 The fact that these parties advertise 
using the trademark is not illegal because they have legitimate 
reasons to attract the attention of those seeking the trademarked 
                                                                                                                 
 
 35. See, e.g., Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums Inc., 381 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(permitting resale and repair shop to use the names of the brands it supplied); Nitro Leisure 
Prods., L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (permitting a 
refurbisher of used golf balls to sell them under their original brand name); Bijur 
Lubricating Corp. v. Devco Corp., 332 F. Supp. 2d 722, 730-31 (D.N.J. 2004) (permitting 
resellers of used and refurbished goods to sell their wares as used or refurbished under the 
original trademark); Bumble Bee Seafoods, L.L.C. v. UFS Indus., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d 1684 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (permitting tuna-salad maker that used Bumble Bee tuna in its salad to 
advertise that fact). 
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good.36 “The result is, of course, that the second-hand dealer gets 
some advantage from the trade mark. But . . . that [rule] is wholly 
permissible so long as the manufacturer is not identified with the 
inferior qualities of the product resulting from wear and tear or 
the reconditioning by the dealer.”37  
The right to engage in truthful advertising extends beyond the 
resale of the trademark owner’s products. Competitors have an 
affirmative right to use others’ trademarks to capture public 
attention and attempt to divert it to their own products by 
providing useful information that compares those products. As 
long as they do not mislead people into presuming some kind of 
affiliation between themselves and the trademark holder, 
competitors may use the mark to explain that their product 
imitates or aspires to the qualities of the trademark holder’s goods.  
In Saxlehner v. Wagner,38 for example, the Supreme Court 
allowed a natural water producer to use its competitor’s mark to 
identify the product that it was copying.39 Justice Holmes 
explained that as long as the defendants did not create confusion 
about the real source of their product, they were free “to tell the 
public what they are doing and to get whatever share they can in 
the popularity of the [trademarked product] by advertising that 
they are trying to make the same article and think that they 
succeed.”40 The Court distinguished between deceptive 
appropriation of goodwill and legitimate comparative advertising, 
concluding that by flagging its product as an imitator of the 
original, “they are not trying to get the good will of the name, but 
the good will of the goods.”41 
Similarly, in Smith v. Chanel, Inc.,42 the court allowed a 
knock-off perfume manufacturer to advertise that its perfume 
smelled like Chanel No. 5.43 The court dismissed Chanel’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
 36. Scott Fetzer Co., 381 F.3d at 439 (“Independent dealers and repair shops may use a 
mark to advertise truthfully that they sell or repair certain branded products . . . .”); Bijur 
Lubricating Corp., 332 F. Supp. at 731 (permitting the use of the trademark in metatags). 
 37. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 130 (1947). In cases involving 
used or reconditioned products, courts require disclosure of that fact rather than preventing 
the seller from using the manufacturer’s trademark. Id.; cf. Rolex Watch, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Michel Co., 179 F.3d 704, 709-10 (9th Cir. 1999) (refusing to allow reseller to use Rolex 
mark when modifications to watches were so substantial that they “result[ed] in a new 
product”). 
 38. 216 U.S. 375 (1910). 
 39. Id. at 379-80. 
 40. Id. at 380. 
 41. Id. at 380-81. 
 42. 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968). 
 43. The defendant’s advertisements included at least two references to Chanel No. 5. In 
one reference, the defendant challenged consumers: “‘We dare you to try to detect any 
difference between Chanel #5 (25.00) and Ta’Ron’s 2nd Chance. $7.00.’” Id. at 563. The 
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argument “that protection should also be extended to the 
trademark’s commercially more important function of embodying 
consumer good will created through extensive, skillful, and costly 
advertising,” reasoning that “[t]he courts . . . have generally 
confined legal protection to the trademark’s source identification 
function for reasons grounded in the public policy favoring a free, 
competitive economy.”44 Landes and Posner explain that the result 
in Chanel is entirely consistent with the search costs rationale: “It 
would have been very costly for consumers to acquire such 
information [about the smell of the original perfume and the copy] 
before purchasing the copier’s perfume because the perfume was 
sold through the mail.”45 But the search costs justification for 
comparative advertising is even stronger than they suggest. 
Truthful information about the similarities between two products 
lowers consumer search costs even if other ways of providing that 
information are not particularly costly. Trademarks work as 
signifiers precisely because they are a particularly efficient means 
of conveying information. They are useful in making comparisons 
for the same reason. 
The same rationale has led courts to allow generic 
manufacturers to imitate branded trade dress in a way that evokes 
but does not confuse.46 These cases, like those involving 
comparative advertising, emphasize that the public benefits from 
having fuller information about the products available in the 
marketplace.47 The connection to search costs may be less obvious 
                                                                                                                                         
 
corresponding order form listed “Second Chance” with “*(Chanel #5)” just below it. Id. 
Accord Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Lenox Labs., Inc., 815 F.2d 500, 503-04 (8th Cir. 
1987) (upholding competitor’s use of the Calvin Klein mark OBSESSION if used in a 
nondeceptive, comparative manner); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Hudson Pharm. Corp., 715 F.2d 
837, 842 & n.12 (3d Cir. 1983) (generic could advertise that its product was “[e]quivalent to” 
plaintiff’s if accompanied by a disclaimer); Upjohn Co. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 598 F. 
Supp. 550, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (permitting maker of Advil to advertise Advil’s equivalent 
strength to Motrin by using the Motrin mark). 
 44. Chanel, 402 F.2d at 566. 
 45. Landes & Posner, supra note 6, at 206. 
 46. See Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 656 F. Supp. 1058, 1068 (D.N.J. 
1987) (construing New Jersey and federal trademark statutes to render unlicensed 
imitation “irrelevant unless confusion also is shown”); see also Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep’t 
Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding no infringement when private label 
retailer “packages its product in a manner to make it clear to the consumer that the product 
is similar to the national brand, and is intended for the same purposes”). 
 47. Am. Home Prods., 656 F. Supp. at 1068. 
The resemblance between two products can alert consumers to the functional or 
utilitarian equivalence between them, to the fact that one product may be substituted for 
the other in the ultimate uses for which the products are intended. The free flow of 
information regarding the substitutability of products is valuable to individual consumers 
and to society collectively, and by providing it a supplier engages in fair competition based 
on those aspects—for example, price—in which the products differ. 
Vol. 97 TMR 1235 
 
than in the comparative advertising case, but it is just as 
compelling: by providing consumers with visual indicators of a 
relationship between the product in question and branded 
products with which they have experience, the practice gives them 
a quick and easy way to comparison shop. Certainly, imitating the 
color of a box or the shape of a package operates at the level of 
subconscious attention-gathering rather than conscious 
comparison. But consumer search is by no means a process that 
always involves a conscious consideration of clearly identified 
criteria; it often turns on more subconscious judgments based on 
experience with particular products or brands.48 Making it easier 
for consumers to find like products will thus sometimes mean 
permitting manufacturers to make them look alike as well as 
describing their similarities, for example by using gold coloration 
on cola cans to indicate that the cola is caffeine-free.49 
Finally, competitors may use descriptive marks in their non-
trademark sense to describe the features or qualities of their own 
products.50 “In essence, [this] fair use defense prevents a 
                                                                                                                                         
 
Id. Not all countries protect comparative advertising to the same degree as the United 
States. See, e.g., Warren S. Grimes, Control of Advertising in the United States and 
Germany: Volkswagen Has a Better Idea, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1769, 1787 (1971) (discussing 
limitations on comparative advertising in Germany). But with the passage of the 
Comparative Advertising Directive, Directive 97/55/EC (Oct. 6, 1997), law in the EU began 
to improve. 
 48. For discussion of the extensive literature on this point in cognitive psychology, see, 
e.g., Goldman, supra note 7; Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 
UCLA L. Rev. 621 (2004); Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in 60 Milliseconds: Trademark Law and 
Neuroscience (working paper 2006). Indeed, one author has gone so far as to argue that 
trademark law as a whole should be understood as “designed to accommodate and even 
harness non-rational human thought processes, rather than suppress or eradicate them.” 
Jeremy N. Sheff, The (Boundedly) Rational Basis of Trademark Liability: Reconciling the 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act and the Lanham Act, 15 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 331, 334 
(2007). To be sure, this fact is sometimes used as an argument in favor of stronger 
trademark protection by those who contend that a mere mental association between two 
products will either confuse consumers or dilute the strength of a trademark. See, e.g., Jacob 
Jacoby, The Psychological Foundations of Trademark Law: Secondary Meaning, Genericism, 
Fame, Confusion, and Dilution, 91 TMR 1013 (2001); Jerre B. Swann & Theodore H. Davis, 
Jr., Dilution, An Idea Whose Time Has Gone; Brand Equity As Protectable Property, The 
New/Old Paradigm, 84 TMR 267 (1994). But as long as consumers are capable of 
distinguishing between the two products, there is no reason to believe that the evocation 
will have any negative effect on the strength or quality of the original brand. Indeed, the 
fact that one product references the other may strengthen the brand association in the 
minds of consumers. See Chi-Ru Jou, The Perils of a Mental Association Standard of 
Liability: The Case Against the Subliminal Confusion Cause of Action, 11 Va. J. L. & Tech. 
2, ¶58-60 (2006). 
 49. We are indebted to Ariel Katz for this example. 
 50. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000) (providing a defense to infringement when a term 
is used “fairly and in good faith . . . to describe the goods or services of [the] party”); 
Zatarain’s, Inc., 698 F.2d at 791 (describing the “fair-use” defense); see also Car-Freshner 
Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[I]t should make no 
difference whether the plaintiff’s mark is to be classed on the descriptive tier of the 
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trademark registrant from appropriating a descriptive term for its 
own use to the exclusion of others, who may be prevented thereby 
from describing their own goods.”51 Again, the interest protected is 
informational: trademark holders may not interfere with the 
ability of others to describe their products in truthful, non-
deceptive ways. 
2. Trademark Use52 
The trademark use doctrine attempts to ensure that the 
trademark grant does not stifle informative speech by non-
competitors. To infringe a trademark, a defendant must “use[]” a 
mark “in commerce” “on or in connection with any goods or 
services.”53 Courts historically insisted that trademark “use” 
required that the defendant market goods or services under the 
mark.54 As the Eighth Circuit recently explained, “the mark holder 
is generally not entitled to relief unless the defendant advertises or 
otherwise promotes [the actual mark] thereby causing the public to 
see the protected mark and associate the infringer’s goods or 
services with those of the mark holder.”55 Defendants who do not 
                                                                                                                                         
 
trademark ladder. . . . What matters is whether the defendant is using the protected word or 
image descriptively, and not as a mark.”). 
 51. Zatarain’s, 698 F.2d at 791. 
 52. For reasons we have explained elsewhere, we believe trademark use is an 
affirmative part of a plaintiff’s trademark case, not a defense. See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & 
Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 
1669 (2007) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, Grounding]. Our discussion here is a necessarily 
truncated one; for a fuller justification for the doctrine, see that article. 
 53. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000); see also id. § 1114(a)(1). The act defines “use in 
commerce” as “the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made 
merely to reserve a right in a mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127. A use qualifies as a use in commerce 
on goods only when 
(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays 
associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the 
goods makes such placement impracticable, then on documents associated with the 
goods or their sale, and 
(B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce. 
Id. For services, a use qualifies “when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of 
services and the services are rendered in commerce.” Id. 
 54. See Felix the Cat Prods. v. New Line Cinema Corp., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1856, 1858 (C.D. 
Cal. 2000) (“Use of the character as an expression of an idea or device to ‘set the mood’ of the 
Picture does not qualify as use of the mark ‘to identify or distinguish’ goods ‘to indicate their 
source’ as required to fall under the purview of trademark law.”). As we explain elsewhere, 
the issue rarely arose until recently because trademark owners did not even try to claim 
ownership over the sorts of uses they now seek to prevent. See Dogan & Lemley, Grounding, 
supra note 52. 
 55. DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bloom, 315 F.3d 932, 939 (8th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). 
Many courts adopting the trademark use doctrine have relied upon the “in connection with” 
language in the Lanham Act. See, e.g., Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 679-
80 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding the appropriate inquiry in evaluating the “in connection with” 
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themselves “use” a mark in commerce can face liability for 
another’s infringement only if they actively induce that 
infringement or knowingly help to bring it about.56 
The trademark use doctrine is under attack in the Internet 
context,57 and we have elsewhere offered a detailed defense of the 
                                                                                                                                         
 
requirement, as “whether [defendant] offers competing services to the public”); Holiday 
Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 623-26 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that the use 
of a telephone number that translated into 1-800-H0LIDAY—with a zero in place of the 
“O”—was not trademark “use” within the Lanham Act because the defendant had not 
advertised its services under the offending alphabetical translation). Others have relied on 
the “use in commerce” language. See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 
400, 407-11 (2d Cir. 2005) (relying on the “use in commerce” requirement to find no direct 
infringement by a party selling pop-up advertisements); Karl Storz Endoscopy-Am., Inc. v. 
Surgical Techs., Inc., 285 F.3d 848, 855 (9th Cir. 2002) (“‘[U]se in commerce’ appears to 
contemplate a trading upon the goodwill of or association with the trademark holder.”); Site 
Pro-1, Inc. v. Better Metal, LLC, No. CV-06-6508, 2007 WL 1385730, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 9, 
2007); Best Western Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. CV-06-1537-PHX-DGC, 2006 WL 2091695, at *5 
(D. Ariz. July 25, 2006); cf. Hamzik v. Zale Corp., No. 3:06-cv-1300, 2007 WL 1174863, at *3 
(N.D.N.Y. April 19, 2007) (finding potential trademark use by a keyword advertiser that 
displayed plaintiff’s trademark in the text of its ad). Still others have held that the 
trademark use doctrine bars claims without specific reference to statutory language. See, 
e.g., Universal Comm. Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 424 (1st Cir. 2007) (rejecting a 
state dilution claim because “Lycos might profit by encouraging others to talk about UCS 
under the UCSY name, but neither that speech nor Lycos’s providing a forum for that 
speech is the type of use that is subject to trademark liability”); Nautilus Group, Inc. v. Icon 
Health & Fitness, Inc., No. CO2-242ORSM, 2006 WL 3761367, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 21, 
2006) (holding that an advertiser’s use of a keyword to generate a sponsored link to run a 
comparative advertisement was not a trademark use for dilution purposes); Merck & Co., 
Inc. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 425, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); 
Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 398-403 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that 
sale of keyword-based advertising does not constitute “trademark use”); Lucasfilm Ltd. v. 
High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 934-35 (D.D.C. 1985). 
 56. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853-54 (1982) (concluding 
that manufacturers and distributors are liable for harm resulting from their intentional 
inducement of another to engage in trademark infringement). 
 57. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 
(9th Cir. 2004) (holding that search engine could face liability as direct infringer for selling 
keyword-based advertisements); Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Google Inc., No. 
1:04CV507LMBTCB, 2004 WL 1977700 (E.D. Va. Aug. 25, 2004) (same); Google, Inc. v. Am. 
Blind & Wallpaper, No. C-03-5340JF (RS), 2007 WL 1159950, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 
2007) (holding that a search engine’s sale of keyword-based advertising can constitute 
trademark use under the Lanham Act); 800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 
2d 273, 282-93 (D.N.J. 2006) (allowing trademark claims against a pay-for-priority search 
engine based on its “sale” of keywords in exchange for prominent placement in search 
results); Merck & Co., Inc. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 425, 426-28 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (rejecting a trademark claim based on keyword-based advertising because 
defendant did not make trademark use); Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 
393, 397-404 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (same); Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, No. Civ. 04-
4371JRTFLN, 2006 WL 737064, at *1-2 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2006) (allowing a trademark 
claim based on keyword-based advertising); Buying for the Home, LLC v. Humble Abode, 
LLC, 459 F. Supp. 2d 310, 321-24 (D.N.J. 2006) (same); Int’l Profit Assocs., Inc. v. Paisola, 
461 F. Supp. 2d 672, 676-80 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (enjoining keyword advertising by a gripe site); 
cf. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 408-12 (2d Cir. 2005) (rejecting 
infringement claim based on pop-up advertisements); Google v. American Blind & 
Wallpaper Factory, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (denying a motion to dismiss a 
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doctrine.58 For now, suffice it to say that limiting trademark rights 
to a right to prevent confusing uses of the mark as a brand helps to 
ensure that trademark rights remain tied to their search costs 
rationale—only those individuals or companies who are using the 
mark to advertise their own products or services have the motive 
and opportunity to interfere with the clarity of the mark’s meaning 
in conveying product information to consumers, and so only those 
uses ought to be of concern to trademark law.59 And by limiting 
trademark claims to those who themselves use marks in a way 
that suggests some affiliation between themselves and the 
trademark holder (and to others intimately involved in their 
infringing activities), the law ensures that information facilitators, 
publishers, and others who bear only a tangential relationship to 
trademark infringement can go about their business without the 
responsibility of having to police all of the parties with whom they 
have commercial relations. 
                                                                                                                                         
 
keyword advertising complaint based on trademark use). Cf. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. 
WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that “use” of trademark to generate 
pop-up ads did not constitute trademark use and could not be basis for direct infringement 
claim); Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mich. 2003) 
(same); U-Haul International, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. Va. 2003) 
(same). 
 58. Dogan & Lemley, Search Costs, supra note *; Dogan & Lemley, Grounding, supra 
note 52. 
 59. The Federal Trademark Dilution Act until 2006 required a “commercial use in 
commerce of a mark or trade name,” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2005), a standard that more 
explicitly incorporated the use requirement by applying only to “commercial speech” as that 
term is defined in First Amendment jurisprudence—speech that proposes a commercial 
transaction. H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031; 
see also Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 905-06 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 
537 U.S. 1171 (2003) (explaining that “noncommercial use” under the Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act “refers to a use that consists entirely of noncommercial, or fully constitutionally 
protected, speech”). While the inartful phrase “commercial use in commerce” was removed 
from the statute in the 2006 revision, the current language of the statute makes it clear that 
the defendant must use the plaintiff’s term as a mark in order to be liable for dilution. It 
speaks expressly of the effect of the defendant’s “mark or trade name,” one that exists 
separately from the plaintiff’s “famous mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006). 
The trademark use doctrine is even more important in dilution than in ordinary 
trademark infringement, because trademarks are often what Barton Beebe calls “floating 
signifiers” that can have multiple meanings, not all of which the trademark owner is 
entitled to control. Beebe, supra note 48, at 667-69. The Visa credit card network may have 
a famous mark entitled to dilution protection, for instance, but that does not give them the 
right to prevent uses of the English word “visa” in connection with travel services 
companies. The trademark use doctrine helps prevent dilution from swallowing language in 
cases such as these. For a discussion of how, see Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The 
Trademark Use Requirement in Dilution Cases, ___ Santa Clara Comp. & High Tech. L.J. 
___ (forthcoming 2008). 
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3. Prohibitions on Naked Licensing and 
Assignments in Gross60 
Unlike copyrights and patents, which have the alienability 
attributes of real property,61 trademarks have never been freely 
alienable.62 Indeed, selling a trademark without the accompanying 
business assets or goodwill is called “assignment in gross,” and it 
can lead to the invalidation of the trademark.63 Unsupervised 
licensing of a trademark can invalidate it as well.64 The rationale 
for preventing free alienation of trademarks is closely tied to the 
search costs theory of trademarks.65 It is hard to see how the goals 
of preventing consumer confusion and encouraging investments in 
product quality would be furthered by allowing a company to sell 
the rights to a mark to another who will not make the same 
products at all or who will make products of different quality. If 
anything, assignments in gross are vehicles for adding to 
consumer confusion, not reducing it.66 
Landes and Posner point out that trademark owners will 
frequently have an incentive to maintain the quality of goods they 
sell even after a transfer of trademark rights in gross. Only in 
“final period” cases, where a company might want to spend down 
                                                                                                                 
 
 60. Portions of this section are adapted from Lemley, Modern Lanham Act, supra 
note 6. 
 61. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(e) (1994); 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000). 
 62. See Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability, 26 Ind. L. Rev. 
519, 553 (1993) (“Trademarks, on the other hand, enjoy none of the ‘bundle of rights’ that 
other forms of property enjoy. . . . Mark holders do not possess a property right in the mark 
itself, because trademarks are nothing when devoid of the goodwill they have come to 
represent or the product on which they are used.”). 
 63. The Lanham Act provides that the trademark owner can assign the mark along 
with the accompanying goodwill. See 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1994). The negative implication is 
that it cannot be assigned otherwise. See Pepsico v. Grapette Co., 416 F.2d 285, 289-90 (8th 
Cir. 1969) (invalidating a trademark assigned in gross). For a discussion of the rule against 
assignment in gross, see 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademark and Unfair Competition 
§ 18.01, at 18-4 to 18-16. For criticism of the rule, see, e.g., Irene Calboli, Trademark 
Assignment “with Goodwill”: A Concept Whose Time Has Gone, 57 Fla L. Rev. 771 (2005); 
McDade, supra note 18. 
For an interesting example of assignments in gross, see Lisa Lerer, Bringing Back the 
Dead, Intell. Prop. L. & Bus., June 2006, at 28 (discussing RiverWest Brands, which buys 
defunct brand names and markets products under those marks). 
 64. See, e.g., Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., 52 F.3d 867, 871-72 (10th Cir. 1995); Dawn 
Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, 267 F.2d 358, 366 (2d Cir. 1959). 
 65. Indeed, the Supreme Court in American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372 
(1926), expressly traced the reasons for the rule to the fact that trademarks were only 
symbols of goodwill, rather than property in and of themselves. Id. at 380. 
 66. See, e.g., Carter, Trouble with Trademark, supra note 18, at 786 (“The deterioration 
of the prohibition on transfers in gross is a reflection of the continuing judicial 
misunderstanding of the theoretical underpinnings of trademark law. As a matter of theory, 
the prohibition on transfers in gross should be a firm one.”); Kratzke, supra note 11, at 247-
49 (offering an economic rationale for the rule against assignments in gross). 
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its stock of goodwill, will a transfer pose risks that a buyer will 
deliberately sell shoddy goods.67 Whether or not a transfer is part 
of a final period game, however, the mental association a consumer 
has between a trademark and a particular product will generally 
be weakened by assignments in gross, and search costs will 
accordingly go up. Indeed, Landes and Posner themselves note 
that an assignment in gross itself makes economic sense primarily 
when it will involve confusing a significant number of consumers.68  
The law does not prevent all deceptions of consumers by the 
mark owner during such a last period problem. If Coca-Cola 
wanted to spend down its goodwill by cheapening Coke, it could do 
so, and people would buy the product for a little while. But the fact 
that the law doesn’t prohibit all possible ways a trademark owner 
might deceive its own consumers for profit doesn’t mean that it 
must permit transactions that seem primarily designed to do so. 
Not only are assignments in gross unsupported by the traditional 
economic rationale for trademarks, but they do active damage to 
the goals of trademark law. The mental associations consumers 
make between trademarks and products are weakened by such 
transfers.69 
The rule against naked licenses and assignments does create a 
problem for search-costs theory, however, because the remedy for 
such assignments—invalidation of the trademark, so that anyone 
is free to use it—is hardly likely to avoid confusing consumers of 
that product. This is an area in which the law has taken a long-
term rather than a short-term view, concluding that invalidating 
trademarks that are assigned in gross will discourage such 
assignments, and therefore will reduce consumer confusion on 
average, even though the remedy doesn’t eliminate confusion in 
the particular case before it.  
B. Doctrines With Ambiguous Search-Cost Effects 
The doctrines discussed in the previous section further the 
search costs rationale of trademark law in a straightforward way—
they permit third parties to give consumers accurate information 
about products or the cultural significance of brand names. But 
trademark law’s procompetitive objectives sometimes require 
more. In the doctrines considered in this section, the law limits a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 67. Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 274-75. 
 68. See id. at 285. 
 69. There is a positive economic case to be made for free alienability in general. 
Restraints on alienation generally interfere with the operation of the market and may 
prevent assets from being put to their highest and best use. While this is a powerful 
argument when applied to most assets, it is weaker when applied to trademarks, since the 
asset is defined by—indeed, consists of—the connection between goods and their particular 
manufacturer. 
Vol. 97 TMR 1241 
 
trademark holder’s rights even when competitors might appear to 
receive a windfall or some consumers may be confused as a result. 
The law does this for one of two reasons—either because overall 
search costs would be higher without the limitation on trademark 
rights, or because recognizing trademark rights would impede the 
ability of competitors to enter markets and compete. In either case, 
however, at least some consumers will suffer higher search costs as 
a result of the limitation. The genericness, functionality, and 
abandonment doctrines present “hard cases” precisely because 
there are search cost rationales on both sides of the argument. 
For the most part, the courts have resolved these hard cases in 
favor of the defendant, withdrawing trademark protection entirely 
in cases in which doing so facilitates search for the majority of 
consumers, or where it ensures competitive access to particular 
product markets. In other words, when market access and 
competition run in tension with the trademark holder’s interests in 
protecting its product-associated goodwill, the competitive 
interests generally trump.70 
From a search costs perspective, the automatic preference 
given to one group of consumers over another can be troubling. 
True, there will be times when the law must choose a rule that will 
disadvantage some consumers in order to protect others, and if 
there really is no alternative, courts must choose the rule that 
most benefits consumers the most. But the law’s preference for all-
or-nothing rules is a poor fit for these hard cases, and the courts 
can and should apply some of these limiting doctrines with greater 
nuance. 
Several venerable doctrines of trademark law fall into this 
ambiguous-case category. We consider three such doctrines, and 
how the law might be modified to minimize consumer harm in 
each case. 
1. Genericide 
The genericness doctrine prevents a party from claiming 
rights to a term “that refers, or has come to be understood as 
referring, to the genus of which the particular product is a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 70. See Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 122: 
Kellogg Company is undoubtedly sharing in the goodwill of the article known as 
“Shredded Wheat”; and thus is sharing in a market which was created by the skill 
and judgment of plaintiff’s predecessor and has been widely extended by vast 
expenditures in advertising persistently made. But that is not unfair. Sharing in the 
goodwill of an article unprotected by patent or trade-mark is the exercise of a right 
possessed by all—and in the free exercise of which the consuming public is deeply 
interested. 
Id. 
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species.”71 Genericness arises in two different situations. Some 
terms are born generic, and the law refuses ever to grant them 
protection. No one is free to claim the term “Computer” as their 
exclusive trademark for computers, preventing competitors from 
using the normal term by which the public refers to the entire 
class of goods.72 Other terms are legitimate trademarks for many 
years, but come over time to be associated in the minds of the 
public not just with the trademark owner or its products but with 
the entire class of goods itself. When that happens, the law 
withdraws the protection it once granted. “Aspirin,” “thermos,” and 
“escalator” are all terms that were once trademarks but suffered 
this “genericide.”73 When a term has come to signify a class of 
goods, competitors have the right to explain what they are selling, 
even when their use of the generic term clearly piggybacks on the 
efforts of the party that first introduced the product.74  
The genericness doctrine arises out of a concern for consumer 
search costs: Consumers will be misled if what they believe is a 
generic term is in fact a product sold by only one company.75 And if 
competitors cannot use the generic term to describe their own 
products, consumers will incur unnecessary expense in trying to 
locate the competitors’ versions. At the same time, the genericide 
branch of the genericness doctrine can impose substantial search 
costs on consumers, particularly when a once-famous mark such as 
“aspirin” or “thermos” becomes generic.76 Consumers who associate 
                                                                                                                 
 
 71. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 72. 2 McCarthy, supra note 60, § 12:1; see Gruner + Jahr USA Publ’g. v. Meredith 
Corp., 991 F.2d 1072, 1078 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that PARENTS magazine could not 
prevent use of the name PARENTS’ DIGEST because “registering the proper noun ‘Parents’ 
as a trademark scarcely can be held to have removed it from being available for use by 
others, or grant exclusive possession of this property right to the trademark registrant” 
(internal citation omitted)); see also J. Kohnstam, Ltd. v. Louis Marx & Co., 280 F.2d 437, 
440 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (denying the exclusivity of the word “matchbox” as used to describe a 
type of toy). 
 73. See 2 McCarthy, supra note 60, § 12:1; cf. Union National Bank of Tex., Laredo, 
Tex., v. Union National Bank of Tex., Austin, Tex., 909 F.2d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 1990) (“The 
English language, more than most, is in a constant state of flux. A word which is today 
fanciful may tomorrow become descriptive or generic.”). 
 74. See, e.g., Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 122; cf. Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9 (“[N]o 
matter how much money and effort the user of a generic term has poured into promoting the 
sale of its merchandise and what success it has achieved in securing public identification, it 
cannot deprive competing manufacturers of the product of the right to call an article by its 
name.”). 
 75. See Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509, 510-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) 
(analyzing whether aspirin had become a generic term to consumers); Landes & Posner, 
supra note 1, at 296; Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 
Yale L.J. 1323, 1337, 1342-43 (1980) (suggesting that hybrid terms would raise consumer 
search costs if they were granted continuing protections despite becoming generic). 
 76. See Bayer Co., 272 F. at 514-15; Am. Thermos Prods., Inc. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 
207 F. Supp. 9, 14 (D. Conn. 1962). 
Vol. 97 TMR 1243 
 
the famous mark with the company that uses it may well be 
confused when competitors begin using the mark as a generic 
term.77  
The law is willing to make that sacrifice if enough consumers 
treat the term as generic, because the harm to consumers who 
associate the term with the entire class of goods outweighs the 
harm to the diminishing number who view it only as a mark.78 But 
because there are consumers on both sides who may be confused, 
the law has traditionally required significantly more evidence of 
genericide than it does for consumer confusion. While courts will 
enjoin a defendant’s use of a mark on a showing of as little as 10% 
consumer confusion,79 they will not declare an existing mark 
generic unless a “substantial majority of the public” believes it 
describes a class of goods rather than a species within that class.80 
Even with this accommodation to the interests of those who 
have come to understand the term as a mark, the all-or-nothing 
nature of the genericide determination is somewhat troubling from 
a search costs perspective. Consumers do not simply flip a switch 
in their minds and go from thinking of a term as signifying a 
product to thinking of it as signifying a class of products. Some 
may strongly hold one view or the other, but others may occupy a 
middle state, in which a term like “Kleenex” can signify a 
trademark in certain contexts at the same time that it is used in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 77. For discussion of the loss of producer goodwill when a mark is declared generic, see 
Stephen L. Carter, Does It Matter Whether Intellectual Property Is Property?  68 Chi.-Kent 
L. Rev. 715, 722 (1993). On the interrelationship between genericide and patent protection, 
see Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 116-18 (noting that because the term “shredded wheat” is 
generic, “the original maker of the product acquired no exclusive right to use it”); cf. Gideon 
Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property, 
88 Va. L. Rev. 1455, 1461 (2002) (commenting on the brand loyalty that remained with 
Bayer decades after “aspirin” became generic). 
 78. See Folsom & Teply, supra note 75, at 1340-41; Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 
291-92; see also Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Geo. L.J. 287, 
315-23 (1988) (noting that generic terms are “extraordinary ideas” that should remain open 
for all to use). 
 79. See Henri’s Food Prods., Co. v. Kraft, Inc., 717 F.2d 352, 358 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(holding that 7.6% confusion was insufficient to establish likelihood of confusion, but 
collecting authorities finding likelihood confusion based on surveys showing as low as 8.5% 
confusion among consumers); Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway 
& Sons, 365 F. Supp. 707, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), mod. on other grounds, 523 F.2d 1331 (2d 
Cir. 1975) (“7.7% . . . perceived a business connection between the two companies and 8.5% 
confused the names”); Jockey International, Inc. v. Burkard, 185 U.S.P.Q. 201, 205 (S.D. 
Cal. 1975) (stating that the survey showed that “11.4 percent of the universe . . . would 
associate defendants’ JOCK SOCK underwear package with plaintiff”); Exxon Corp. v. 
Texas Motor Exchange of Houston, 528 F.2d 500, 507, 208, U.S.P.Q. 384, 390 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(stating that 15% was sufficient).  
 80. Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1989); King-
Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1963). 
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casual conversation in a generic way.81 A legal determination of 
genericide is an instantaneous elimination of the associations 
between mark and product built up in the minds of consumers. As 
such, it cannot help but confuse some—even some who also use the 
term in a generic sense in some contexts.82 
We think that a legal doctrine designed to minimize consumer 
search costs should respond to the complex of consumer interests 
on both sides of a genericide case by tending towards standards 
rather than absolute rules.83 Trademark’s fair use doctrine serves 
as an example.84 Under that doctrine, competitors are free to use 
descriptive terms that have acquired secondary meaning, but only 
in contexts in which they use those terms for their descriptive 
rather than their trademarked meaning, and only if the defendant 
uses the term in good faith.85 Whether that use is permissible will 
depend on the strength of the mark, the nature of the use and of 
the goods on which it was made, the defendant’s use of a separate 
brand to identify and distinguish its own goods, and other factors. 
Courts applying the defense will tolerate some consumer confusion 
among the plaintiff’s customers in order to permit the defendant’s 
customers to easily find the products they are looking for, but the 
fact and extent of such confusion is relevant in deciding whether to 
permit the use.86 
Something similar to the fair use doctrine might well serve 
consumers better than the all-or-nothing rule regarding genericide. 
Rather than immediately halting trademark protection as soon as 
fifty-one percent of the public views a former trademark as generic, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 81. See Beebe, supra note 48 (noting the ability to hold several meanings for terms in 
the mind simultaneously); Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism 
Conundrum, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 1789, 1803 (2007) (stating that “trademarks function 
differently for different people in different contexts and are capable of different yet 
simultaneous uses”); Folsom & Teply, supra note 75, 1339-42 (noting that many, and 
perhaps most, generic marks are hybrids with both trademark and generic meanings, and 
explaining the costs that such hybrids can impose on consumers). 
 82. See Jerre B. Swann, Genericism Rationalized, 89 TMR 639, 653 (1999) (“Consumer 
confusion is virtually a dictated consequence whenever a word used by one firm is declared 
generic . . .”). 
 83. See also id. at 655 (“[T]he line between a fringe generic and a naturally descriptive 
term is far too thin and inconsequential to justify the expenditure of enormous judicial 
resources to ferret out its placement.”); Vanessa Bowman Pierce, If It Walks Like a Duck 
and Quacks Like a Duck, Shouldn’t It Be A Duck?: How a “Functional” Approach 
Ameliorates the Discontinuity Between the “Primary Significance” Tests for Genericness and 
Secondary Meaning, 37 N.M. L. Rev. 147 (2007). 
 84. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000). 
 85. See, e.g., Zatarain’s, Inc., 698 F.2d at 791. 
 86. See KP Permanent Makeup Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, 543 U.S. 111 (2004) 
(finding that the fair use defense presupposes tolerating some confusion), on remand, KP 
Permanent Makeup Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, 408 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that 
confusion is still relevant in determining whether the fair use defense applies). 
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the law could take a more case-by-case approach that focuses on 
the relationship between the plaintiff’s interest and the 
defendant’s use. If a substantial portion of the public still views 
the term as a trademark, but the majority views it primarily as a 
generic term, then both of these sets of consumers would benefit 
from an approach that allowed competitors to use the term in its 
generic sense, but prevented its use as a trademark by anyone 
other than the original trademark holder and required those who 
did use the term to try to avoid confusing consumers who thought 
of it as a mark. Courts, in other words, could permit uses of the 
generic term to describe the class of goods, while at the same time 
prohibiting competitors from adopting the term as a mark, or 
minimizing their own mark in an effort to confuse the consumers 
who still think of the mark as signifying a particular product. To 
be sure, courts today sometimes take steps to protect trademark 
owners in this situation—for example, by establishing rules 
requiring competitors who adopt a generic term that was once a 
protectable trademark to take steps to minimize confusion with 
the former mark owner.87 But the approach is neither 
systematically adopted nor consistent with the general thrust of 
genericide, which holds generic marks completely without 
protection. A better approach would recognize that the confusing 
use of even generic terms can constitute unfair competition under 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act88 when the generic term has 
trademark significance among some portion of the public and the 
defendant’s use capitalizes on that trademark meaning. Cases like 
Genesee are on the right track in effectively treating genericide as 
a continuum rather than a threshold.89 
We think a standard rather than an absolute rule is also 
appropriate in those rare instances in which a term that was born 
generic comes over time to signify a single source of goods. From a 
search costs perspective, the situation is simply the inverse of 
genericide—a group of consumers have treated the term as 
generic, but over time another group—sometimes the vast 
majority—comes to understand it as a trademark. Microsoft’s 
WINDOWS is an obvious example. There is good evidence that at 
the time Microsoft adopted the term in 1983, it was in general use 
                                                                                                                 
 
 87. Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 150 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(concluding that plaintiff’s mark Honey Brown for its ale was generic, but defendant could 
still be liable if it did not use “every reasonable means to prevent confusion” in using the 
generic term) (quoting Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 121); see also, e.g., Home Builders Ass’n v. L 
& L Exhibition Mgmt., Inc., 226 F.3d 944, 950 (8th Cir. 2000); Forschner Group, Inc. v. 
Arrow Trading Co., 124 F.3d 402, 408-09 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 88. 45 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2004). 
 89. Cf. Desai & Rierson, supra note 81, at 1855 (contending that genericness 
determination should turn on mark’s significance in the commercial marketplace, rather 
than in common language or parlance). 
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to describe graphical user interface-based computer operating 
systems.90 But by this century, the vast majority of computer users 
likely think of the term as signifying only Microsoft’s operating 
system. Under current law, the only relevant question in such a 
case seems to be what consumers thought in 1983 when the term 
was adopted.91 But from a search costs perspective, marks should 
be able to lose their generic character as well as gain it, depending 
on the reactions of consumers.92 And just as the transition need 
not be an on-off switch for genericide, so too courts can apply a 
continuum in deciding whether a once-generic term has come over 
time to serve as a mark. 
Treating genericness as a sliding scale rather than an absolute 
bar may have other salutary effects as well. Right now, trademark 
owners go to great lengths to prevent genericide.93 They constrain 
the way they use their mark, never treating it as a noun or a verb, 
but only as an adjective.94 They run advertisements to try to 
influence the way a mark is used in conversation.95 They send 
threatening or cajoling letters to dictionaries, newspapers, and 
artists, encouraging them to modify their use or description of a 
trademarked term.96 They have even come up with a (mythical) 
cause of action called “contributory dilution” that would allow 
them to sue dictionaries or ordinary citizens for misusing “their” 
term in dialogue.97 All of these expenditures are socially wasteful, 
                                                                                                               
 
 90. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com, Inc., 2002 WL 32153471 (W.D. Wash. 
May 13, 2002). 
 91. Id. (marshalling evidence from that period). 
 92. See Anti-Defamation League of B’Nai B’Rith v. Arab Anti-Defamation League, 340 
N.Y.S.2d 532, 543 (N.Y. Sup. 1972) (suggesting that generic term can acquire secondary 
meaning and thus become a protectable mark). 
 93. See Desai & Rierson, supra note 81, at 1834-36 (making this point, and exploring in 
detail the socially wasteful expenditure of resources to avoid genericide). 
 94. This particular piece of advice, widespread in the trademark bar, appears to be 
based on a myth. No court has ever held a mark generic because it was used as a verb. See 
Rose A. Hagan, The Myths of Genericide, 22:2 ABA Intell. Prop. L. Newsletter 13 (2004), 
available at http://www.abanet.org/intelprop/bulletin/winter_04.pdf. 
 95. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age 679 
(3d ed. 2003) (reproducing ad by Xerox corporation). 
 96. For one cartoonist’s amusing response to such a letter, see 
http://extlab1.entnem.ufl.edu/IH8PCs/vol3/V3N2.html.  
 97. See Jerre B. Swann, The Validity of Dual Functioning Trademarks, Genericism 
Tested By Consumer Understanding Rather Than By Consumer Use, 69 TMR 357, 375 
(1979). We want to emphasize that there is no such contributory dilution theory in the law 
today. No appellate court has ever adopted such a theory, and the Lanham Act provides no 
statutory support for the theory. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 
F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting claim of “contributory dilution” and noting that no 
court has ever adopted it); Ty, Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 512 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting 
that the caselaw doesn’t support this broader conception of dilution, and questioning the 
desirability of creating such a doctrine); Freecycle Network v. Oey, 2007 WL 2781902 (9th 
Cir. Sept. 26, 2007) (there is no cause of action for “disparagement” of a mark by using it 
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and if they are successful the resulting restraint on speech may do 
even more harm to society. They are a function of the mark 
owners’ fear of the catastrophic loss of genericide. These 
expenditures would be largely unnecessary if courts were to adopt 
a fact-specific approach to genericide, because the focus would be 
on the defendant’s use in context rather than on what the public or 
dictionaries say. 
2. Functionality 
The functionality doctrine, like the genericness doctrine, 
prevents parties from claiming trademark rights in a product 
feature that “‘is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it 
affects the cost or quality of the article.’”98 But while genericness 
generally applies to word marks, functionality applies to product 
configuration and occasionally packaging. Like genericness, 
functionality is a threshold rather than a linear variable in 
existing law.99 Even when consumers have come to associate a 
particular product feature with a single seller, that feature cannot 
serve as a trademark if exclusive use of it would put competitors at 
a non-reputation-related disadvantage. The U.S. Supreme Court 
recently emphasized, for example, that even if the public 
associates a particular feature with its first producer, the Lanham 
Act does not prevent others from copying that feature if it is part of 
what makes the product work.100 
The connection between the functionality doctrine and a 
functioning market is even more fundamental than search costs—
consumers cannot choose between competing products if one 
manufacturer can use a law designed to facilitate an efficient 
market to eliminate competing products altogether. Preventing 
trademark owners from protecting functional aspects of their 
                                                                                                                                         
 
generally); but cf. Kegan v. Apple Computer, Inc., 1996 WL 667808 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (finding 
genuine issue of fact as to contributory dilution claim, suggesting that “encouragement” of 
dilution could constitute contributory dilution). Still, the fact that the argument is made is a 
testament to the lengths to which trademark owners will go to try to avoid genericide. 
 98. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 32-33 (quoting Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165). Strictly 
speaking, after Congressional action in the late 1990s functionality is no longer a defense 
but rather a part of a trademark owner’s affirmative case in actions brought under §43(a). 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3); see Tumblebus Inc. v. Cranmer, 399 F.3d 754, 768 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 99. But also like genericide, there is some support for preventing confusing uses under 
section 43(a) in a few cases that find functionality but are concerned with the confusion that 
might result. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A Teleological Approach to 
Trademark Law, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 611, 746-51 (1999). 
 100. See TrafFix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 34-35 (“The Lanham Act . . . does not protect 
trade dress in a functional design simply because an investment has been made to 
encourage the public to associate a particular functional feature with a single manufacturer 
or seller.”). On the contours of trademark functionality doctrine, see Mark Alan Thurmon, 
The Rise and Fall of Trademark Law’s Functionality Doctrine, 56 Fla. L. Rev. 243 (2004); 
Robert C. Denicola, Freedom to Copy, 108 Yale L.J. 1661, 1670-74 (1999). 
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products is therefore consistent with a search costs rationale. 
Indeed, one might think of it as a precondition to consumer search. 
While this is easiest to see with technological functionality—
imagine the seller of a wheel claiming the round design as a 
trademark and preventing competitors from making round 
wheels—it is also true of aesthetic functionality.101 A design 
feature is aesthetically functional if it causes the product to be 
more desirable not because of a reputational connection, but 
because it is intrinsically attractive. Many goods are purchased on 
aesthetics in whole or in part. Allowing someone who develops an 
attractive style of painting or a sleek design for a product to 
prevent others from using it interferes with the market for the 
product and generally serves no trademark-related purpose. 
As with genericide, however, there is a problem. Because 
functional characteristics, aesthetic appeal, and source-identifying 
information may sometimes be lumped together in the same 
product—think of the Ferrari102—strict application of the 
functionality doctrine also has the potential to increase rather 
than decrease consumer search costs in some cases.103 When a 
functional product feature has achieved secondary meaning, for 
example, some consumers might assume that all products with 
that feature come from a single source. If others can copy that 
feature, those who make such an assumption will be confused; if 
not, those who just want the product for its intrinsic value will lose 
the benefit of competition to produce the product.104 
Unlike genericide, a sliding scale is harder to imagine with 
functional products because the consumer interest in use of the 
product is not simply avoiding confusion as to source, but access to 
the product itself. But that doesn’t mean that nothing can be done 
                                                                                                                 
 
 101. See Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9. 
 102. See Ferrari S.p.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1246-47 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that the exterior design of the Ferrari is nonfunctional). 
 103. See Peter E. Mims, Note, Promotional Goods and the Functionality Doctrine: An 
Economic Model of Trademarks, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 639, 658-59 (1984) (recognizing the role 
that the functionality doctrine plays in lowering search costs, but arguing that the doctrine 
of aesthetic functionality interferes with that role). For academic commentary on the 
functionality doctrine and the tradeoffs it embodies, see Maury Audet, Wilhelm Pudenz v. 
Littlefuse, Inc.: Next Replace Misnomer “Incontestable” with “Conclusive,” 40 Idea 473, 483-
87 (2000); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A Teleological Approach to 
Trademark Law, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 611, 699-701 (1999); Thurmon, supra note 100, at 244-53. 
 104. Robert Bone points out that courts in functionality cases have to decide between 
two different economic costs: the increase in consumer search costs if the trade dress is 
denied protection, balanced against the increase in price that might occur if the originator 
has exclusive rights over the product feature. See Bone, supra note 9, at 2180 (“The goal of 
the functionality doctrine is to strike a balance between limiting the acquisition of market 
power and reducing information-related consumer harms. This means that a functionality 
analysis should tolerate market power over price when doing so is justified by the 
information-related consumer harms that trade dress protection avoids.”). 
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to limit the potentially confusing consequences of a finding of 
functionality. As with some cases involving generic marks, some 
courts have responded to these risks not by prohibiting use of the 
feature, but by requiring competitors to “use reasonable care to 
inform the public of the source of [their] product[s].”105 To the 
extent that the use may even then mislead some members of the 
public, the functionality doctrine presupposes that the harm to 
consumers in these cases is outweighed by the greater availability 
of competitive products in the first place. Given what is at stake, 
that seems to us the right balance. 
3. Abandonment 
Trademarks are protected so long as the mark owner uses 
them in commerce. When use stops for good, the trademark is 
deemed abandoned.106 The abandonment rule is designed to 
release marks back to the public for use by others, preventing 
companies from “warehousing” marks.107 But releasing marks back 
to the open market can have a rather significant negative impact 
on consumer search. If a company builds up substantial goodwill 
before going out of business, that goodwill will often persist long 
after the company and its products disappear. The abandonment 
rule, and in particular the three-year presumption of 
abandonment, permits new trademark owners to capitalize on that 
goodwill, creating confusion or at the least causing cognitive 
dissonance within the minds of consumers who remember a mark 
as signifying one product and must now relearn it as signifying a 
different product in the same field. Examples abound, and include 
the reappearance of both FRONTIER and PAN AM as airline 
names and a race to claim DURAFLAME as a trademark for fake 
fire logs.108  
To be sure, some—though hardly all—courts seem willing to 
avoid finding abandonment based on an involuntary cessation of 
business, and continuing goodwill in the mark is one reason they 
                                                                                                                 
 
 105. Gum, Inc. v. Gumakers of Am., Inc., 136 F.2d 957, 960 (3d Cir. 1943) (citing Kellogg 
Co., 305 U.S. at 120); Am. Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imps., Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1141 (3d 
Cir. 1986) (“[I]f the functional feature or combination is also found to have acquired 
secondary meaning, the imitator may be required to take reasonable steps to minimize the 
risk of source confusion.”); cf. Am. Fork & Hoe Co. v. Stampit Corp., 125 F.2d 472, 475 (6th 
Cir. 1942) (“[I]n order to establish even the limited right of compelling appellant to take 
positive steps to avoid confusion, the existence of secondary meaning must plainly appear.”). 
 106. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (providing that abandonment occurs when “use has been 
discontinued with intent not to resume such use,” or when the mark hasn’t been used for 
three years). 
 107. See Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Sed Non Olet Denarius, Ltd., 817 F. 
Supp. 1103 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 108. California Cedar Prods. Co. v. Pine Mountain Corp., 724 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1984). 
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do so.109 But those courts do so only when a company ceases 
business involuntarily, and under the statutory framework they 
can do even that only for three years. Goodwill in a major mark 
can persist long after that, particularly in cases where a company 
changes its name but continues in business. Federal Express 
changed its name to FedEx several years back, and it is the new 
name that appears on the website and on all packaging. But it is 
doubtful that consumers would benefit should the name be deemed 
abandoned, permitting a competitor to use it.110 
The statutory framework seems to serve little purpose within 
the search costs framework, and can affirmatively increase 
consumer search costs. The statute should be revised to preclude 
others from adopting a mark in any case in which significant 
brand recognition remained in the old name, even after it is 
abandoned.111 The result may be that no one is entitled to use a 
particular mark after a well-known owner abandons it, but that 
result is the one that is least likely to confuse consumers.112 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Economists have long recognized that the goal of facilitating 
the free exchange of goods requires consumers to be able to find 
what they are looking for quickly and cheaply. Reducing consumer 
search costs, in turn, is the primary traditional justification—and 
still the best one—for having trademark law. What we have shown 
in this article is that the search-costs rationale justifies not only 
the affirmative rights trademark law confers, but also the limits 
the law places on those rights. To a large extent, existing doctrine 
is consistent with trademark theory. But a few doctrines—notably 
                                                                                                                 
 
 109. See, e.g., Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Panamerican Sch. of Travel, Inc., 648 F. 
Supp. 1026, 1031 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 810 F.2d 1160 (2d Cir. 1986); Am. Int’l Group v. 
American Int’l Airways, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 1470 (E.D. Pa. 1989). But see Major League 
Baseball, 817 F. Supp. at 1128-29 & n.20 (refusing to protect BROOKLYN DODGERS mark 
after the team’s move to Los Angeles despite presence of significant name recognition).  
 110. In fact, FedEx has likely retained some use of the FEDERAL EXPRESS mark to 
avoid just such an outcome. Whether that will be effective is open to question, though. See 
Exxon v. Humble Exploration, Inc., 695 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding that a token 
continuing use of Humble Oil name after name change was not sufficient to avoid 
abandonment). 
 111. Cf. Stanley A. Bowker, Jr., Note, The Song Is Over But the Melody Lingers On: 
Persistence of Goodwill and the Intent Factor in Trademark Abandonment, 56 Fordham L. 
Rev. 1003, 1006-07 (1988). 
 112. There is some question who would enforce such a right in the case of common-law 
usage as opposed to an effort to register the abandoned mark. We believe the former owner 
of the abandoned mark should have a right to seek injunctive relief, but not damages, in 
such a case. While one might reasonably wonder whether a company that abandoned the 
mark would have any such incentive, the fact that there are a sizeable number of cases 
involving abandoned marks suggests that, for whatever reason, they often do. 
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genericness and abandonment—can have the unintended 
consequence of increasing rather than reducing consumer search 
costs. We suggest ways those doctrines can be modified so all 
aspects of trademark law—the grant of rights and the limitation 
on those rights—serve the purposes of that law. 
 
